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he  current  financial  crisis  is  posing 
new  challenges  for  central  bankers  and 
policymakers,  taking  them  well  beyond 
the traditional framework they have used 
to address previous crises. In part, these new steps 
reflect dramatic changes in the financial system—
most notably a substantial growth in that part of 
the market not covered by traditional public safety 
nets,  along  with  a  rising  complexity  in  financial 
instruments,  counterparty  risks,  and  institutional 
relationships on both a domestic and global basis.
These  developments  are  complicating  efforts 
to respond to the current crisis, while also revealing 
serious  shortcomings  in  our  crisis  management 
framework.  For example, many of the steps taken 
have raised important issues with regard to moral 
hazard  and  the  subversion  of  market  discipline, 
equitable  treatment  of  different  institutions  and 
segments of the market, and public interference in 
credit allocation and other market processes.
These issues strongly suggest a need to look 
carefully at what we have done and consider what 
principles should guide any further steps we take 
in addressing the crisis. Moreover, it is appropriate 
to begin thinking about how we might construct 
a  clearer  set  of  rules  and  policies  to  help  create 
more resilient financial markets and a better crisis 
management framework for responding to future 
events.  Such  thought  should  also  include  exit 
strategies for how we can terminate the numerous 
temporary assistance programs adopted in this crisis 
and restore the private market incentives we have 
sacrificed.
I will focus on three policy issues: (1) How will 
we determine which institutions are to be covered 
by the public safety net and, accordingly, subject to 
close supervision? (2) What is the appropriate scope 
for central bank lending? (3) How should we resolve 
solvency problems at nonbank financial institutions?   
Before proceeding, though, I would like to briefly 
share my perspectives on some 
of the general lessons we have 
learned from the crisis.  
  
What have I learned?
One of the most obvious 
observations from the current 
turmoil  is  that  a  crisis  can 
stem  from  parts  of  the 
financial market not covered 
by  traditional  public  safety 
nets.  In past crises, we have 
typically  been  able  to  direct 
our efforts toward banks and 
other  depository  institutions 
where we have safety nets and a supervisory and 
regulatory  framework  to  address  institutional 
problems and restore market confidence. However, 
many of the institutions and markets now under 
stress are not subject to prudential oversight. They are 
not protected by well-defined safety nets and, when 
assistance is provided, do not have a framework in 
place to help address moral hazard and other policy 
issues.    
Also, when confidence is fragile and the risk of 
contagion is great, central banks and other public 
authorities  increasingly  are  compelled  to  provide 
extensive  liquidity  and  other  assistance  to  the 
nonbank portion of financial markets. In this regard, 
it is clear in the United States that whenever threats 
to financial stability occur, the financial markets, the 
public and the political authorities all look to the 
Federal Reserve to respond regardless of where the 
threats originated. 
We  should  further  acknowledge  that  an 
enormous  burden  has  been  placed  on  monetary 
policy  to  respond  to  the  current  crisis,  although 
monetary policy is not designed to address many 
of  the  underlying  factors,  particularly  when  the 
problems extend beyond liquidity and raise issues 
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of solvency and informational shortcomings. Going 
forward, it will be essential that our financial system 
has a wider range of policy and market-based options 
to resolve crises, with less reliance being placed on 
monetary policy. 
 
How will we determine which 
institutions should be covered by  
the safety net?
Because  many  of  the  problems  in  this  crisis 
are linked to institutions and markets not covered 
by traditional public safety nets, we clearly need to 
rethink what our approach should be in providing 
assistance  to  these  segments  and,  accordingly,  in 
extending oversight and regulation to them.
As  we  begin  to  think  about  these  issues,  I 
believe it is important to have a clear understanding 
of what we are trying to accomplish. In my view, 
a public policy objective of maintaining financial 
stability should involve two key features: preventing 
credit disruptions emanating from financial markets 
and financial institutions from adversely affecting 
the broader economy, and maintaining the integrity 
and functioning of the payments system.
From a historical perspective, safety nets and 
supervision have been tailored to the specific charters 
under which financial institutions operate and offer 
products. As a result of competition and financial 
innovation,  many  of  the  distinctions  between 
financial institutions and products are eroding. The 
current crisis, along with this growing convergence 
among  institutions,  raises  many  questions  about 
what criteria should be used and how far we should 
go  in  deciding  which  institutions  should  operate 
under safety nets and prudential supervision. 
In general, I favor limiting the scope of our 
federal safety net. In a number of ways, we struggle 
in  dealing  with  banks  that  are  regarded  as  too 
big to fail and in finding the appropriate balance 
between  market  and  supervisory  discipline.  Such 
problems  would  be  greatly  magnified  if  we  were 
to permanently extend the safety net to encompass 
a growing range of institutions and markets. I am 
especially  concerned  that  we  could  put  ourselves 
in the position of mixing banking and commercial 
activities if we were to extend financial assistance to 
firms conducting a wide range of activities. Such 
assistance could put public authorities further into 
the  process  of  allocating  credit  and  selecting  the 
winners and the losers in the marketplace.
Having said that, we still need to look carefully 
at  the  safety  net  issue  and  think  about  what  we 
should do, given the likelihood we will have to deal 
with  problems  in  the  broader  financial  markets 
again. Can we design a more limited safety net for 
this part of the market, supported by an equally 
limited  system  of  oversight  and  regulation?  Can 
we  accomplish  this  without  stifling  the  type  of 
innovation that makes our markets more efficient 
and more responsive to customer needs?
I am not sure any of us have a good answer to 
these questions. I have several suggestions focused 
on trying to lessen the need for safety nets.
Because  overleveraging  has  been  a  major 
problem  during  the  current  market  meltdown,  I 
would  suggest  extending  some  form  of  leverage 
standards—a minimum capital-to-assets ratio—to 
those portions of the market that have suffered from 
inadequate  capital.  This  type  of  capital  standard 
would also help reinforce the pressure that financial 
investors and creditors are now putting on firms to 
raise capital and clean up balance sheets.
In this regard, I have always supported simple 
leverage standards for financial institutions. If we 
extend capital standards to a broader range of firms, 
a leverage ratio seems more advisable to me than 
risk-based capital standards, which are likely to be 
far more complex, procyclical, and, in many ways, 
easier to evade.  In fact, I am most concerned that 
any institution that tends to underestimate its risk 
exposure—as many recently have  —will be just as 
likely to underestimate its capital needs if allowed to 
operate a risk-based capital standard, such as Basel 
II. Risk-based capital standards may also encourage 
institutions to lower their capital, instead of building 
it up, in the prosperous times that typically precede 
a crisis.
I am also intrigued by the ideas presented at 
our Jackson Hole Symposium for making capital 
vary  in  a  more  beneficial  way  over  the  business 
cycle and during a crisis. One idea is the use of 
capital insurance to facilitate a financial institution’s 
recapitalization  during  a  systemic  financial  crisis. 
Another  related  idea  is  mandatory  debt-equity 
conversions  to  supplement  capital  in  a  financial 
crisis and to provide more discipline on the part of 
bondholders. As part of any such recapitalization, 
I  support  the  mandatory  cessation  of  dividend 
payments with the loss of earnings.
Supervisory oversight of institutions that affect 
an economy’s financial stability is important. And, 
the most difficult aspect of this is that we balance 
supervisory  authority  and  capital  requirements 
against the need to maintain financial innovation 
and not drive activities into less-regulated markets. 
This is one reason why I would prefer to limit the 
safety  net  to  protecting  the  intermediation  and 
payments mechanisms, while giving market forces 
as  much  latitude  as  possible  to  guide  financial 
innovation.
There  may  also  be  other  ways  that  we  can 
strengthen institutions and markets while lessening 
the  need  for  safety  nets.  I  have  long  supported 
increased public disclosure. With the information 
problems  present  in  today’s  markets,  we  need  to 
work with market participants in a concerted effort 
to improve disclosures and remove as much of the 
complexity and opaqueness as we can.
Overlapping  these  questions  are  two  further 
issues: the appropriate scope of central bank lending 
and the resolution of solvency problems at nonbank 
financial institutions.  
What is the appropriate scope for 
central bank lending?
Traditional  central  bank  lending  has  been 
through  the  discount  window  with  eligibility 
generally restricted to depository institutions. For 
the most part, central bank lending also has been 
short-term  and  fully  collateralized  with  sound 
assets. During the current crisis, though, the Federal 
Reserve and a number of other central banks have 
chosen to expand the use of their lending facilities.
For  the  Federal  Reserve,  these  efforts  have 
included a number of different measures: a Term 
Auction  Facility  designed  to  increase  liquidity 
among  depository  institutions;  an  expanded 
securities lending program with broader collateral 
requirements  to  make  illiquid  securities  more 
liquid; a primary dealer credit facility to increase 
liquidity  at  investment  banks;  lending  to  fund 
the  resolution/workout  of  several  large  nonbank 
financial organizations; and most recently, funding 
to  support  money  market  mutual  funds  and  the 
commercial paper market.
This  broadening  of  central  bank  lending 
reflects, in part, the expanding role that nonbank 
financial  institutions  and  more  complex  financial 
instruments play in the system. A key question now 
for central banks is: Should central bank lending 
return to its traditional role once the current crisis 
abates, or is this broader role the new reality?
Broadening the scope of central bank lending 
has raised a number of issues, some old and some 
new.  A long-standing concern is that central bank 
lending should not be used to prop up insolvent 
institutions, allowing them to take further risks that 
could end up costing the taxpayer.
But the broadened scope of central bank lend-
ing raises new issues as well. For example, why should 
institutions and financial markets maintain much li-
quidity on their own if they know central banks are 
likely to provide it when needed? Related to this is 
the idea that central banks may be subsidizing access 
to liquidity for a growing list of borrowers. In addi-
tion, an expanded role for the discount window may 
bring  central  banks  more  directly  into  allocating 
credit as collateral requirements are selectively relaxed 
and lending is used to support specific segments of   
the market.
While it may be too early to decide how central 
bank  lending  should  be  used  going  forward,  we 
should start developing the basic principles. Here 
are some ideas that I suggest for consideration.  
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I  have  already  indicated  my  preference  for 
putting some bounds on the federal safety net. But 
if the discount window—as part of that safety net—
is to be available to a broader range of institutions, 
then these institutions should be subject to some 
form of oversight and regulation to reduce moral 
hazard concerns. This oversight would help bring 
lending to nonbank financial institutions into closer 
conformity with that of depository institutions.
We should think of how central bank lending 
could be structured to keep it from being a subsidized 
source of liquidity. Because this lending is essentially 
a line of credit, one idea is to charge a fee for access, 
then require institutions seeking emergency access 
without  a  funded  line  of  credit  to  pay  a  higher 
penalty rate.
A final consideration is how far central bank 
lending  should  be  extended.  The  focus  should 
be  on  protecting  the  intermediation  process  and 
the  payments  mechanism.  Because  of  the  credit 
allocation issues and other concerns, I would argue 
for at least drawing a sharp line between banking 
and commerce, with our discount window only used 
to fund institutions and markets that play strictly a 
financial role.
How should we resolve solvency  
problems at nonbank financial  
institutions?
One other key issue arising out of the current 
crisis  is  our  approach  in  dealing  with  nonbank 
institutions that face solvency crises. Major examples 
of this now include Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, 
AIG, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In each 
case, a unique approach has been followed. To some 
extent,  these  approaches  reflect  differences  in  the 
structure and exposures of these institutions. In some 
cases there were rushed decisions on whether they 
are too big to fail. However, it is apparent that we 
would benefit from a clear set of rules for handling 
such firms, much like we have established to deal 
with failing depository institutions. As it is now, we 
only have two, more problematic choices: Putting 
together ad hoc rescue packages or relying on the 
more  drawn-out  corporate  bankruptcy  process, 
which  may  raise  added  concerns  and  liquidity 
problems during a financial crisis.
We have some history in the United States on 
how to deal with large failing banks. This experience 
is far from perfect, especially with regard to banks 
viewed as too big to fail, but we have been able to 
construct  a  resolution  framework  that  safeguards 
our payments system and helps to maintain public 
confidence.
For example, our bank resolution framework 
focuses on timely action to protect depositors and 
other claimants. Insured depositors at failing banks 
typically regain full and immediate access to their 
funds, while uninsured depositors often benefit from 
quick, partial payouts based on expected recoveries. 
Also, a continuation of many banking activities and 
relationships is likely to occur given such resolution 
options as deposit transfers and asset sales to other 
banks, purchase and assumption transactions, bridge 
banks, conservatorships, and open bank assistance.   
Other  important  features  of  the  bank  resolution 
framework  include  depositor  preference  statutes 
and a clear priority for handling other claimants, as 
well as an orderly receivership process with limited 
allowance for judicial intervention.
We  have  a  system  of  prompt  corrective   
action  by  supervisors  and,  in  the  case  of  failure,   
bank  resolutions  that  impose  the  least 
possible  cost  on  the  FDIC.  These  provisions 
help  promote  a  resolution  of  banking   
problems  before  they  can  become  magnified 
and  more  costly  to  the  industry  and,  ultimately, 
to  taxpayers.  Requirements  for  least-cost 
resolutions  and  priority  of  claimants  also  help 
to  put  stockholders,  subordinated  debtholders 
and uninsured depositors at risk, thereby lessening 
some  of  the  moral  hazard  concerns  associated 
with  the  federal  safety  net.  Exceptions  to  least-
cost  resolution  can  be  made  when  the  failure  of 
an  institution  could  pose  a  systemic  risk,  but 
even  in  such  cases,  regulators  can  still  make 
stockholders  and  managers  bear  the  risk  of   
their actions.  
I offer the thought that similar principles should 
be followed in setting up a resolution process for other 
types of financial institutions. The uncertainty that 
surrounded recent workouts of nonbank institutions 
has not only lowered market confidence, but also 
provided inconsistent treatment of stockholders and 
creditors. In addition, the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers  has  raised  doubts  about  how  different 
claims will be handled and how long the court and 
receivership process will take.
In  establishing  a  resolution  process  for 
nonbank financial institutions, there are a number 
of important principles to follow and several issues 
to consider.  First, whatever the range of institutions 
granted  access  to  the  public  safety  net,  we  must 
design a process that limits moral hazard concerns 
and encourages market discipline. In particular, we 
must acknowledge that the market will make better 
decisions on capital and leveraging when investors 
and management are subject to the possibility of loss. 
As a result, nonbank resolutions or takeovers should 
leave  stockholders  and  subordinated  debtholders 
fully  exposed  to  the  losses  in  their  firms.  In  the 
same way, such resolutions should provide for new 
management and directors either through a merger 
with a sound institution or the insertion of a new 
management team.   
Other resolution steps should be structured to 
help ensure a continued flow of financial activities, 
especially with regard to custodial accounts and any 
short-term claims that might harm counterparties 
if not resolved in a timely manner. A continuity of 
operations  could  be  facilitated  through  mergers, 
conservatorships or something similar to the FDIC’s 
bridge-bank powers, especially for large institutions 
that might pose a systemic risk if their operations 
were disrupted.
I would also suggest using something similar 
to  open-bank  assistance  for  nonbank  financial 
institutions that appear to be viable. However, this 
is  only  provided  that  the  assistance  is  structured 
in a manner that does not subsidize stockholders 
or creditors or enable institutions to take on more 
risk. As in banking, the authority to take action in a 
timely manner would help to reduce losses and best 
protect customers and creditors and their access to 
accounts and funds. 
A final set of issues is how to fund resolutions 
at nonbank financial institutions and who would 
be  in  charge  of  the  process.  In  order  to  protect 
taxpayers, I believe that industry resources, wherever 
possible, should be used to provide the major source 
of funds—much like in banking with the deposit 
insurance fund.  We should be giving thought to 
how such a fund could be established, particularly 
for less-regulated portions of the financial markets.
Concluding comments
It is clearly time to take a comprehensive look 
at our financial system and its regulation. We have 
experienced financial crises in many different parts 
of  the  world  over  the  past  few  decades,  and  the 
current financial crisis may be the most extensive 
one we have experienced since the 1930s.
Over  the  last  year,  central  banks  and  other 
public authorities have taken a nearly unprecedented 
series of steps—steps that virtually all of us would 
admit are well outside of our comfort zones. Also 
of concern to me is that recent public actions may 
result in unintended effects, most notably in terms 
of creating unwelcome incentives, unjustly favoring 
selected participants and segments of the financial 
markets, and putting taxpayers at significant risk.
To address these issues and concerns, we need 
to have a clearly understood framework to make 
our financial system more resilient in the face of 
unexpected events and to resolve problems in our 
financial  markets  when  they  invariably  arise.  In 
keeping with these objectives, I have tried to present 
a few ideas and basic principles for how we might 
structure  public  safety  nets,  discount  window 
lending and resolutions of large nonbank financial 
institutions.   
There are obviously many issues to be resolved 
as we go forward, and I will certainly be interested 
in finding out what ideas all of you have for longer-
term reform.  
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